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Abstract
This paper studies optimal interest-rate policies when the central bank op-
erates a channel system of interest-rate control. We conduct our analysis in a
dynamic general equilibrium model with inﬁnitely-lived agents who are subject
to idiosyncratic trading shocks which generate random liquidity needs. In re-
sponse to these shocks agents either borrow against collateral or deposit money
at the central bank at the speciﬁed rates. We show that it is optimal to have
a strictly positive interest-rate corridor if the opportunity cost of holding col-
lateral is strictly positive and that the optimal corridor is strictly decreasing in
the collateral’s real return.
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Bank and the University of Pennsylvania for research support. The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and not those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.
11 Introduction
In this paper we analyze monetary policy when the central bank operates a channel
system of interest-rate control. In a channel system a central bank oﬀers two standing
facilities to commercial banks that clear transactions through the central bank. A
lending facility where it is ready to supply money overnight at a given lending rate
and a deposit facility where banks can deposit excess money overnight at a deposit
rate. The interest-rate corridor - deﬁned by the diﬀerence between the lending and
the deposit rates - is chosen to keep the overnight interest rate in the money market
close to the target interest rate. Several central banks now operate channel systems.1
For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) oﬀers a borrowing facility with a
lending rate that is 100 basis points higher than its policy interest rate and a deposit
facility with a deposit rate, which is 100 basis points below its policy rate.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1 displays the interest-rate corridor operated by the ECB. The solid red
curve is the lending rate and the solid blue line the deposit rate. The black line is the
o v e r n i g h ti n t e r e s tr a t et h a tt h eE C Bt a r g e t sv i ai t sc h a n n e ls y s t e m . C e n t r a lb a n k s
1Channel systems of interest rate controls are operated by the Bank of Canada, the European
Central Bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, or the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (see Woodford
2000 for more details).
2typically react to changing economic conditions by shifting the interest-rate corridor.
Figure 1 illustrates such shifts by the ECB. However, occasionally central banks also
change the size of their interest-rate corridor as can be seen from Figure 1 where
the ECB increased its corridor dramatically from 50 basis points to 200 basis points
around February 1999.
In a channel system there is no limit to the size of deposits on which interest is
paid. There is also no limit to the size of a loan that a commercial bank can obtain
provided that the loan is collateralized. Collateral are typically low-risk and low-yield
assets such as government securities. The rate of return of the collateral determines
the opportunity costs for commercial banks of accessing the lending facility of the
central bank where a high rate of return implies a small or zero opportunity cost.
We consider three questions in this paper. First, what is the optimal interest-rate
corridor in a channel system of interest-rate control? Second, how is the optimal
corridor aﬀected by the opportunity cost of holding collateral? Third, how should a
central bank modify its corridor when it reacts to changing economic conditions?
To answer these questions we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with
inﬁnitely-lived agents and a central bank.2 The agents are subject to idiosyncratic
trading shocks which generate random liquidity needs. Due to these shocks there is
an ex-post ineﬃciency in that some agents are holding idle balances while others are
cash constrained. To reduce or eliminate this ineﬃciency the central bank operates a
standing facility where agents either borrow or deposit money at the speciﬁed rates.
The central bank cannot force agents to repay their loans and so in accordance with
central bank practice we assume that the central bank only provides collateralized
loans.
The following results emerge from the model. With respect to the ﬁrst question
we show that it is optimal to have a strictly positive interest-rate corridor if the
2We abstract from modelling commercial banks explicitly. Rather, we assume that all agents
have direct access to the central bank’s lending and deposit facility. The trading shocks are an
approximation for the money market where banks receive liquidity shocks at the end of the day.
Since there is no trading of reserves feasible after this market, banks who need liquidity have no
choice but to use the standing facility oﬀered by the central bank.
3opportunity cost of holding collateral is strictly positive. The optimal size of the
corridor depends on parameters of the model - such as the nature of the trading shocks,
preferences and production technology - and we show how the channel should be
adjusted to changes in these parameters. With respect to the second question we show
that the optimal corridor is strictly decreasing in the rate of return of the collateral
(which means that it is increasing in the opportunity cost of holding collateral).
When the rate of return of the collateral attains the point where the opportunity
cost of acquiring collateral is zero it is optimal to set deposit and lending rates equal.
Finally, with respect to the third question we show that a central bank that must
change its policy in response to a change in economic conditions has two options. It
can either shift the interest-rate corridor while keeping the size of the band constant
as illustrated in Figure 1, or, it can change the size of the interest-rate band. For
instance, it can keep the deposit rate constant and increase the borrowing rate.3
These results are intuitive. When the opportunity cost of holding collateral is
strictly positive, the optimal monetary policy trades-oﬀ the cost of holding collateral
and the consumption ﬂow from borrowing at the facility. When collateral is costly
to hold, agents should optimally not hold too much collateral. This is achieved by
increasing the cost of transforming collateral into money, that is by increasing the
interest rate corridor. The larger the interest rate corridor, the more costly it will be
to transform collateral into money. By modifying the liquidity properties of collateral,
monetary policy aﬀects the portfolio decision of agents and as a consequence the real
allocation.
An interesting aspect of our model is that money growth and hence inﬂation is
endogenous unlike in most theoretical analysis of monetary policy that character-
3Interestingly the US Federal Reserve System recently modiﬁed the operating procedures of its
discount window facility. Prior to 2003, the discount window rate was set below the target federal
fund rate, but banks faced penalties when accessing the discount window. As a result, the window
was rarely used. In 2003, in an eﬀort to encourage the use of its discount window, the Federal
Reserve decided to set the discount window rate 100 basis point above the target federal fund rate
and eased access conditions to the discount window. The resulting framework shares some properties
with a channel system of interest-rate control, where the deposit rate is zero (which is equivalent of
not allowing to deposit) and the lending rate 100 basis point above the target rate.
4ize optimal policy in terms of a path for the money supply. In practice, however,
monetary policy involves rules for setting nominal interest rates and most central
banks specify operating targets for overnight interest rates. This paper therefore is
an attempt to break the apparent dichotomy (Goodhard, 1989) between theoretical
analysis and central bank practices.
1.1 Background4
To understand some of the features of our environment it is useful to have some
information on monetary policy procedures at central banks that operate a standing
facility. This section does not aim at being general and we will therefore concentrate
on the case of the ECB’s operating procedures. The ECB has two main instruments
for the conduct of its monetary policy.
First, it conducts weekly main reﬁnancing operations that are collateralized loans
with a one week maturity. Main reﬁnancing operations are implemented using a
liquidity auction where banks bid for liquidity. Bids consist of an amount of liquidity
and an interest rate. The total amount to be allocated is announced before the
auction. Following the auction, the ECB allocates liquidity according to the rates, in
a descending order. The minimum bid rate is the main policy rate used by the ECB
to implement monetary policy.
Second, it oﬀers a standing facility with a lending rate that is 100 basis points
higher than its minimum bid rate and a deposit rate, which is 100 basis points below
its minimum bid rate. Loans are provided overnight at the standing facility and have
to be fully collateralized with eligible assets. Eligible banks can access the standing
facilities at any time of the day. They may also access the facilities after making
a request at the latest 30 minutes after the actual closing time of TARGET, the
large value payment system of the Eurosystem through which central bank operations
are settled.5 An overdraft position on a bank’s TARGET account is automatically
4See ECB (2004) for more details of the ECB’s implementation of monetary policy.
5On the last Eurosystem business day of a minimum reserve maintenance period, the deposit
facility can be accessed for 60 minutes after the actual closing of TARGET.
5transformed into an overnight loan via a recourse to the lending facility against eligible
assets.
While the main reﬁnancing operations aim at managing the liquidity conditions
in the market, the standing facilities is intended to satisfy bank’s temporary needs for
liquidity. We will concentrate the analysis on the second aspect, and we abstract from
modelling liquidity injections in an interbank market. Rather we take the view that
transactions on the interbank market have already taken place and we concentrate
on bank’s temporary needs for liquidity that are satisﬁed via the standing facilities.
1.2 Literature
There are very few theoretical studies of channel systems of interest-rate control. In
a series of papers Woodford (2000, 2001, 2003) discusses and analyses the channel
system of interest-rate control.6 His very careful analysis of the channel system is
complementary to ours. We depart from his approach by considering a general equi-
librium model where the demand for base money (settlement balances) is endogenous.
Moreover, we conduct a welfare analysis and derive the optimal interest-rate corri-
dor and we show how the interest-rate corridor aﬀects the growth rate of settlement
b a l a n c e sw h i c hi se n d o g e n o u si ss u c has y s t e m . 7
Some other aspects of our model appear in other papers. These papers however
consider issues that are not related with the analysis of a channel system of interest-
rate control. For example, Lagos and Rocheteau (2004) and Kiyotaki and Moore
6The starting point of his discussion is the possibility that in the future the demand for base
money could shrink considerably or even be eliminated due to innovations in the payment system.
This possibility has led many authors to speculate that central banks could loose their ability to
control aggregate spending via their monetary policy. Friedman (1999) argues along this line in his
paper "The Future of Monetary Policy: The Central Bank as an Army with only a Signal Corps." In
his 2000 paper Woodford argues that even when base base is "largely or even completely eliminated,
monetary policy should continue to be eﬀective. Macroeconomic stabilization depends only upon
the ability of central banks to control a short-term nominal interest rate, and this would continue
to be possible, in particular through the use of a channel’ system for the implementation of policy,
like those currently used in Canada, Australia and New Zealand."
7It is endogenous in our model because we assume that there are no open market operations. In
practice the central bank can operate a channel system and engage in open market operations and
by doing so change the stock of settlement balances.
6(2003) study how illiquid capital interacts with the use of ﬁat money. The role of
collateral for monetary policy is for example investigated in Buiter and Sibert (2005)
and Braggion, Christiano and Roldos (2005).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the environment. The
equilibrium is characterized in Section 3 and the optimal monetary policy is derived
in Section 4. Section 6 concludes.
2 Environment
There is a [0,1] continuum of inﬁnitively-lived agents. Time is discrete and in each
period two perfectly competitive markets open sequentially. The ﬁr s tm a r k e ti sa
settlement stage where all agents produce and consume a general good and settle
their claims from the previous period with the central bank. General goods are
produced solely from inputs of labor according to a constant return to scale production
technology where one unit of the consumption good is produced with one unit of labor
generating one unit of disutility. Thus, producing h units of the general good implies
disutility −h, while consuming h units gives utility h.8
In the second market agents produce or consume a perishable good. At the be-
ginning of this market, agents receive idiosyncratic preference and technology shocks
which determine whether they consume or produce in market 2. With probability
1−n an agent can consume and cannot produce. We refer to these agents as buyers.
With probability n, an agent can produce and cannot consume. These are sellers.
Agents get utility u(q) from q consumption in the second market, where u0(q) > 0,
u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +∞ and u0(∞)=0 . Producers incur a utility cost c(q)=q from
producing q units of output. All trades are anonymous and agents’ trading histo-
ries are private information. Since sellers require immediate compensation for their
8The environment is similar to the one introduced by Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2004).
The linear preferences in market 1, ﬁrst introduced by Lagos and Wright (2005) to get a degenerate
distribution of money holdings at the beginning of a period, allows us to interpret transactions that
are taking place in the ﬁrst market as settlement transactions, as in Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides
(2005).
7production eﬀort money is essential for trade.9 The discount factor is β where for
technical reasons we assume that β>n .
Standing facility Since our agents are subject to trading shocks there is an ex-
post ineﬃciency in that sellers are holding idle balances while buyers are cash con-
strained.10 To reduce or eliminate this ineﬃciency the central bank operates a stand-
ing facility. It oﬀers nominal loans   at an interest rate i and promises to pay interest
idd on nominal deposits d with i ≥ id.11 Since we focus on standing facilities, we
restrict ﬁnancial contracts to overnight contracts. An agent who borrows   units of
money from the central bank in market 2, repays (1 + i)  units of money in market 1
of the following period. Also, an agent who deposits d units of money at the central
bank in market 2 of period t receives (1 + id)d units of money in market 1 of the
following period.
Accordingly, in the absence of open market operations, the money stock evolves
endogenously as follows
M+1 = M − (1 − n)i  + nidd, (1)
where M denotes the per capita stock of money at the beginning of period t.I n
the ﬁr s tm a r k e tt o t a ll o a n s(1 − n)  are repaid. Since interest rate payments by the
agents are (1 − n)i , the stock of money shrinks by this amount. Interest payments
by the central bank on total deposits are nidd.T h ec e n t r a lb a n ks i m p l yp r i n t sa d d i -
tional money to make these interest payments so the stock of money increases by this
amount. The central bank operates the standing facility at zero cost. Consequently,
the central bank cannot make proﬁts or losses.
9By essential we mean that the use of money expands the set of allocations (Kocherlakota 1998
and Wallace 2001).
10Models with this property include Bewley (1980), Levine (1991), Green and Zhou (2005), and
Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2004).
11This restriction eliminates the possibility for arbitrage where agents borrow and subsequently
make a deposit at interest id >i , thus increasing their money holdings at no cost.
8Default In any model of credit, default is a serious issue. Since production is
costly, those agents who borrow in market 2 have an incentive to default in market 1
of the following period. To prevent default the central bank requires general goods as
collateral for each loan. We assume that general goods that are produced in market
1 can be stored at the central bank with a constant return to scale technology that
yields R ≥ 1 units of general goods in market 1 of the following period. We also
impose βR ≤ 1 since when βR > 1 agents would store inﬁnite amounts of goods
which is inconsistent with equilibrium. General goods can only be stored at the
central bank. Consequently, general goods cannot be used to issue collateralized
IOU’s among private agents.
First-best allocation The expected lifetime utility of the representative agent for
a stationary allocation (q,b) at the beginning of a period is given by
(1 − β)W =( 1− n)[u(q) − q]+( βR− 1)b (2)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the expected utility from consuming and
producing the market 2 good. The second term is the utility of producing collateral
and receiving the return in the following period.
It is obvious that the ﬁrst-best allocation (q∗,b ∗) satisﬁes q = q∗ where q∗ is the
value of q that solves u0(q)=1 .M o r e o v e r ,b∗ =0if βR < 1 and b∗ is indeterminate
if βR =1 . Thus, a social planner would never choose a positive amount of collateral
when collateral is costly.
3 Symmetric stationary equilibrium
In period t,l e tφ ≡ 1/P bet h er e a lp r i c eo fm o n e yi nm a r k e t1 .W ef oc u so ns y m m e t r i c
and stationary equilibria where all agents follow identical strategies and where real
allocations are constant over time. In a stationary equilibrium beginning-of-period
9real money balances are time invariant
φM = φ+1M+1. (3)
This implies that φ+1/φ = P+1/P = M/M+1 = γ. Moreover, we restrict our attention
to stationary equilibria where γ is time invariant.
We let V (m,b) denote the expected value from entering market 2 with m units of
money and b collateral. W(m,b, ,d) denotes the expected value of entering the ﬁrst
market with m units of money, b collateral,   loans, and d deposits. For notational
simplicity we suppress the dependence of the value function on the time index t.
I nw h a tf o l l o w sw el o o ka tar e p r e s e n t a t i v ep e r i o dt.
3.1 Market 1: settlement
In the ﬁrst market, the problem of a representative agent is:
W(m,b, ,d)= m a x
h,m2,b2
−h + V (m2,b 2)
s.t. φm2 + b2 = h + φm + Rb + φ(1 + id)d − φ(1 + i) .
where h is hours worked in market 1. Using the budget constraint to eliminate h in
t h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o n ,o n eo b t a i n st h eﬁrst-order conditions12
Vm = φ (4)
Vb ≤ 1 ( = if b>0 )( 5 )
Vm ≡
∂V(m2,b2)
∂m2 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into the
second market in period t. Since the marginal disutility of working is one, −φ is the
utility cost of acquiring one unit of money in the ﬁr s tm a r k e to fpe r i odt. Vb ≡
∂V(m2,b2)
∂b2
is the marginal value of taking additional collateral into the second market in period
12We focus on monetary equilibria where (4) holds with equality. In contrast, there are monetary
equilibria where agents do not use the standing facility implying b =0because Vb < 1.
10t. Since the marginal disutility of working is 1, −1 is the utility cost of acquiring one
unit of collateral in the ﬁr s tm a r k e to fp e r i o dt. The implication of (4) and (5) is
that all agents enter the following period with the same amount of money and the
same quantity of collateral (which can be zero). This is the reason why, as in Koeppl,
Monnet and Temzelides (2005), we interpret this market as a settlement stage. By
itself, this market does not increase social welfare. Rather, it involves a mere transfer
of an asset between participants in order to settle claims from the previous period.
T h ee n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o n sa r e
Wm = φ;Wb = R;W  = −φ(1 + i);Wd = φ(1 + id) (6)
where Wj is the partial derivative of W(m,b, ,d) with respect to j = m,b, ,d.
3.2 Market 2: liquidity shocks
At the beginning of market 2, agents receive idiosyncratic shocks which determine
whether they are consumers or producers. With probability 1 − n an agent becomes
a consumer and with probability n a producer. Let q and qs respectively denote the
quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by a seller in market 2.L e t  b ( s)
and db (ds) respectively denote the loan obtained and the amount of money deposited
by a buyer (seller) in market 2. An agent who has m money and b collateral at the
opening of market 2 has expected lifetime utility
V (m,b)=( 1 − n)[u(q)+βW(m − pq − db +  b,b,  b,d b)]
+n[−qs + βW(m + pqs − ds +  s,b,  s,d s)]
where q,qs,  s,  b,d s and db are chosen optimally as follows.
It is obvious that buyers will never deposit funds in the central bank and sellers
will never take out loans and therefore db =0and  s =0 . It is also straightforward
to show that sellers will deposit as much money as they can if id > 0 and therefore
11ds = m + pqs.I f id =0 ,t h e ya r ei n d i ﬀerent and we simply assume ds = m + pqs.
Accordingly, we get
V (m,b)=( 1 − n)[u(q)+βW(m − pq +  ,b, ,0)]
+n[−qs + βW (0,b,0,m+ pqs)]
where qs and q solve the following optimization problems.
A seller’s problem is maxqs [−qs + βW (0,b,0,m+ pqs)]. Using (6), the ﬁrst-order
condition reduces to
βpφ+1 (1 + id)=1 . (7)
If an agent is a buyer, he solves the following maximization problem:
max
q, 
u(q)+βW(m − pq +  ,b, ,0)
s.t. pq ≤ m +   and   ≤ ¯  
where
¯   = Rb/
£
φ+1 (1 + i)
¤
(8)
is the maximal amount that a buyer can borrow from the central bank since b units
of collateral transform into Rb units of real goods at the beginning of the following
period. These goods can be sold for Rb/φ+1 units of money. Finally, the collateral
must also cover the interest payment.
Using (6) the buyer’s ﬁrst-order conditions can be written as
u
0(q)=pβφ+1(1 + λq) (9)
λq = λ  + i (10)
where βφ+1λq is the multiplier of the buyer’s budget constraint and βφ+1λ  the one
12of the borrowing constraint. Using (7) and combining (9) and (10) yields
u
0(q)=
1+i + λ 
1+id
(11)
If the borrowing constraint is not binding and the central bank sets i = id, trades are
eﬃcient. If the borrowing constraint is binding, then u0(q) > 1 which means trades
are ineﬃcient even when i = id.
Using the envelope theorem and (9), the marginal value of money in market 2 is
Vm =( 1− n)u
0(q)/p + nβφ+1(1 + id) (12)
The marginal value of money has a straightforward interpretation. An agent with an
additional unit of money becomes a buyer with probability 1 − n in which case he
acquires 1/p units of goods yielding additional utility u0(q)/p. With probability n he
becomes a seller in which case he deposits overnight his money yielding the nominal
return 1+id. Note that the standing facility increases the marginal value of money
because agents can earn interest on idle cash.
S i n c ei ne q u i l i b r i u mt h e r ei sn od e f a u l tt h er e a lr e t u r no fc o l l a t e r a li sβR.T h er e a l
return is smaller than the marginal value Vb if λ  > 0. To see this, use the envelope
theorem to derive the marginal value of collateral in the second market




Thus, the diﬀerence between the real return and the marginal value is (1 − n)βφ+1λ 
∂ 
∂b
which is positive if collateral relaxes the borrowing constraints of the buyers. It is
critical for the working of the model that Vb >β R . The reason is that, since βR−1 is
negative, agents are only willing to hold collateral if the liquidity value as expressed
by the shadow price λ  is positive.
13U s e( 7 )a n d( 8 )t ow r i t e( 1 3 )a sf o l l o w s :
Vb =( 1− n)u
0(q)βR/∆ + nβR. (14)
where ∆ ≡ (1 + i)/(1 + id) and ∆/βR is the price of collateral in terms of goods in
market 2. A buyer can use the collateral to borrow R
φ+1(1+i) units of money which
allows him to acquire R
pφ+1(1+i) =
βR(1+id)
1+i = βR/∆ units of goods.
Monetary policy aﬀects the allocation and welfare by its choice of ∆.A ni n c r e a s e
in ∆ increases the cost of acquiring money and hence market 2 goods with collateral.
3.3 Symmetric stationary equilibrium




≥ (1 − n)[u
0(q)/∆ − 1] ( = if b>0 ). (15)
Then (4), (7), (12), and taking into account that in a stationary equilibrium M+1/M =
φ/φ+1 = γ, yield
γ − β (1 + id)
β (1 + id)
=( 1− n)[u
0(q) − 1]. (16)
Also from (1) we get




where zm = m/p and z  =  /p.T od e r i v et h i se q u a t i o nw eu s ed = m + pqs,m a r k e t
clearing nqs =( 1−n)q and we we take into account that in symmetric equilibrium all
agents hold identical amounts of money when they enter the second market. Then,
f r o mt h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n to ft h eb u y e rw eh a v e
q = zm + z . (18)
14Finally, since βR < 1 in any equilibrium where agents hold collateral it must be the
case that the borrowing constraint is binding and so from (7) and (8)13
z  = βRb/∆. (19)
We can use these ﬁve equations to deﬁne a symmetric stationary equilibrium. They
determine the endogenous variables (γ,q,z ,z m,b). Note that all other endogenous
variables can be derived from these equilibrium values.
Deﬁnition 1 A symmetric stationary equilibrium is a list (γ,q,z ,z m,b) satisfying






Then we have the following
Proposition 1 For any (i,id) with i ≥ id ≥ 0 there exists a unique symmetric
stationary equilibrium such that
z  > 0 and zm =0 if and only if ∆ =1
z  > 0 and zm > 0 if and only if 1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆
z  =0and zm > 0 if and only if ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆.
Several points are worth mentioning. First, the critical element to verify in the
proof is under which condition agents acquire collateral. They are willing to borrow
at the standing facility if the borrowing rate is not too high, i.e. ∆ < ˜ ∆. Second,
the critical value ˜ ∆ is increasing in R.M o r e o v e r , b is increasing in R too. Agents
increase their collateral holdings and hence ﬁnance a larger share of their consumption
13If the borrowing constraint is non-binding (λ  =0 ), equation (13) reduces to Vb = βR implying
from (5) that b =0since we have βR < 1. Consequently, in any equilibrium where agents hold
collateral it must be the case that the constraint is binding (λ  > 0)a n ds o  = ¯   = Rb/
£





φ+1 (1 + i)
¤
.
15by borrowing if R is increasing. Third, if ∆ =1agents are not willing to hold money
across periods. They just use collateral to borrow money to ﬁnance their consumption.
This however does not mean that money is not used since it still plays the role of a
medium of exchange in market 2. It only means that agents do not want to hold it
across periods.
Given a real allocation (q(∆),b(∆)) any pair (i,id) satisfying ∆ = 1+i
1+id is consis-
tent with this allocation. Thus, there are many ways to implement a given policy ∆.
The allocations only diﬀe ri nt h er a t eo fi n ﬂation. This can be seen from (17) which
c a nb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s
γ
1+id
=1− (1 − n)(∆ − 1)
z 
zm
Since the right-hand side is a constant for a given ∆ the inﬂation rate γ−1 is increasing
in id.
In the introduction we have seen that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (see
Figure 1) reacts to changing economic condition by shifting the interest rate corridor
δ = i − id.A nu p w a r d ss h i f to fδ increases ∆ and so reduces aggregate output q and
borrowing z . Another way to tighten monetary policy is by increasing the size of the
band δ since increasing δ also reduces both q and b.
For the rest of the paper we focus on the real allocation (q,b) since only con-
sumption q and collateral b aﬀect the expected lifetime utility (2). In the proof of




0(q)/∆ + n (21)







(1 − n)(∆ − 1)
1+βn(∆ − 1) − ∆/R
¸
.
16These two equations have an intuitive interpretation. (21) deﬁnes the liquidity
premium on the collateral. While collateral costs -1 to produce, it returns βR ≤ 1.
Hence, if βR < 1, agents need an incentive to hold collateral. This is provided
by making collateral liquid. The liquidity premium from holding collateral is (1 −
n)βR(u0(q)/∆ − 1). As the return on collateral increases, its liquidity premium will
increase. Hence in equilibrium agents will be given less incentives to hold it. This
means that the marginal beneﬁt from an additional unit of collateral u0(q)/∆ will
drop as R increases. When interest rates are ﬁxed, q must increase. Alternatively, an
increase in ∆ aﬀects negatively the liquidity premium, since it is now more diﬃcult to
transform collateral into goods. To establish the liquidity premium to its equilibrium
level, the marginal beneﬁt of an additional unit of good must rise and therefore
q decreases. In this way monetary policy aﬀects the quantities that are traded in
equilibrium.
Given the liquidity premium, (22) gives us the amount of collateral an agent
holds, which in turn determines the composition of an agent’s portfolio. Indeed,
we know that q = z  + zm = βRbF(∆) and z  = βRb/∆ from (19). Therefore,




1+βn(∆−1)−∆/R. Given an amount of collateral b and
its return R, a tightening of monetary policy - an increase in ∆ - will decrease the
liquidity of collateral, so that agents will have more incentives to increase their money
holdings zm.
4 Optimal policy
We now derive the optimal policy. The central bank’s objective is to maximize the
expected lifetime utility of the representative agent. It does so by choosing consump-
tion q and collateral holding b to maximize (2) subject to constraint that its choice
is consistent with the allocation given by (15)-(18). The policy is implemented by
choosing ∆.
Assume ﬁr s tt h a ti ti so p t i m a lt os e t∆ ≥ ˜ ∆. In this case no agent is borrowing
17at the standing facility which implies that b =0 . Moreover, from (16) and (17) q
satisﬁes







Thus, any ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆ implements the same real allocation (b,q)=( 0 , ˜ q).
Now consider the largest q that the central bank can implement. From (15) the
largest q is attained when ∆ =1 .I ts a t i s ﬁes







Thus, the policy ∆ =1attains the allocation (b,q)=( ˆ q/(βR), ˆ q) since no agent
is holding money across period when ∆ =1 . Accordingly, the central bank’s is
constrained to choose quantities q such that ˆ q ≥ q ≥ ˜ q.
Finally, if the optimal policy satisﬁes ˜ ∆ > ∆ ≥ 1 the central bank is constrained




(1 − n)[u(q) − q]+( βR− 1)b






and ˆ q ≥ q ≥ ˜ q.
where to derive (23) we use (21) to replace ∆ in (22).
Proposition 2 There exists a critical value R such that if R<R, then the optimal





The striking result of Proposition 2 is that it is never optimal to set a zero interest
rate band δ = i − id since the optimal interest rate band satisﬁes ∆ > 1.T h er e a s o n
is that for society the use of collateral is costly since βR − 1 is negative. However,
without collateral consumption q =˜ q is small since agents economize on their cash
holdings. The central bank thus faces a trade-oﬀ. It can encourage the use of costly
18collateral to increase consumption. The optimal policy simply equates the marginal
beneﬁt of additional consumption to the marginal cost of holding collateral. It is
interesting to note that the use of ﬁat money is not costly for society, as money can
be produced without cost. Nevertheless each agent economizes on its use because it
must be acquired before it can be spend.
If R is small (R<R) the cost of holding collateral is so high that the central
bank’s optimum is to discourage the use of collateral.14 It does so by implementing





so that agents ﬁnance some of their consumption through borrowing
at the standing facility. An increase in R reduces the optimal ∆. In the limit as
R → 1/β the holding of collateral becomes costless and we now consider the optimal
policy in this limiting case.
Costless collateral Holding collateral is costless when R =1 /β since the cost of
acquiring one unit is equal to the discounted return βR. To avoid indeterminacies
of the equilibrium allocation we consider the limiting allocation when the rate of
return of the collateral satisﬁes R → 1/β.15 In this limiting case the critical value is
˜ ∆ =
1−βn
β−βn > 1 and Proposition (1) continues to hold. We deﬁne the allocation that
is attained under the optimal policy as the limiting allocation that is attained when
i → id.W eﬁnd the following results.
Proposition 3 With costless collateral, the optimal policy i → id implements the
ﬁrst-best allocation q∗. The price level approaches inﬁnity.
14This is similar as in Lagos and Rocheteau (2004) albeit in a very diﬀerent context. They
construct a model where capital competes with ﬁat money as a medium of exchange. They show
that when the socially eﬃcient stock of capital is low (which is the case when the rate of return is
low) a monetary equilibrium exists that dominates the nonmonetary one in terms of welfare. So in
this case it would be optimal to discourage the use of capital as a medium of exchange.
15We consider the limiting allocation since at R =1 /β agents are indiﬀerent of how much collateral
they acquire even if they plan not to use it to obtain goods. If λ  > 0 agents are strictly better oﬀ
by increasing their collateral holdings up to the amount where λ  =0 . However, they are indiﬀerent
between any amount of collateral that yields λ  =0 . In the limiting allocation attained when
R → 1/β agents acquire the smallest amount consistent with λ  =0 .
19The proof of the ﬁrst part is an immediate consequence of equation (15) which
implies that limβR→1 u0 (q)=∆.S i n c et h eﬁrst-best allocation requires that u0 (q)=1
the result is established.
To understand why the price level approaches inﬁnity under the optimal policy
note that if i = id > 0, then money is strictly dominated in return by collateral.
The reason is that the collateral can costlessly be transformed into money and so any
consumption level that can be achieved with money can be achieved with collateral
at no additional cost. However, the collateral has the intrinsic return βR =1while
t h er e t u r no nm o n e yi s
β
γ < 1.16 Consequently, the demand for money approaches
zero. To encourage agents to hold the stock of money its price must approach zero.
This immediately implies that p → +∞ and therefore zm = M+1/p → 0.O n l ya tt h e
Friedman rule i = id =0the returns are equal and so agents are indiﬀerent between
holding money, collateral or both.
5C o n c l u s i o n
t.b.a.
16This follows from (16) together with u0(q)=∆.
206 APPENDIX
In this Appendix we show that if the central bank’s objective is to maximize the
expected discounted utility of the representative agent, the central banks objective
is to maximize (2). To derive (2) we must ﬁrst calculate hours worked in market 1.
The money holdings at the opening of the ﬁr s tm a r k e ta r e˜ m =0having bought and
˜ m = m + pqs having sold. Hence, hours worked are
hb = φ[m+1 +( 1+i) ] − (R − 1)b
hs = φ[m+1 − (1 + id)(m + pqs)] − (R − 1)b
Since h = nhs +( 1− n)hb,w eg e t
h = −(R − 1)b + φm+1 +( 1− n)φ(1 + i)  − nφ(1 + id)(m + pqs)
= −(R − 1)b + φm+1 + φm − φm +( 1− n)φ(1 + i)  − nφ(1 + id)(m + pqs)
= −(R − 1)b + ϕ +( 1− n)φ  − nφ(m + pqs)+φm
= −(R − 1)b +( 1− n)φ  − nφ(m + pqs)+φm
where the last equality follows from (1) and the fact that d = m + pqs,s ot h a t
ϕ = φm+1 − φm +( 1− n)φi  − nφid(m + pqs)=0 .
H e n c ew eg e t
h = −(R − 1)b +( 1− n)φ  +( 1− n)φm − nφpqs = −(R − 1)b.
21where the last equality follows from the fact that pq = m +   and market clearing
requires qs = 1−n
n q. Then, welfare is given by




j {(1 − n)[u(q) − q]+( R − 1)b}
=
(1 − n)[u(q) − q]+( βR− 1)b
1 − β
To calculate welfare, it is also useful to consider the economy that starts at date
t =0 , at the beginning of the centralized market when agents having no ﬁnancial
obligations toward the central bank. From then on, the economy is in steady state.
At t =0 , agents do not hold any collateral and have to produce the steady state level
b. Hence, at t =0 , h(0) = b,w h i l ef o ra l lt ≥ 1, h(t)=−(R − 1)b.
The expected discounted payoﬀ f r o md a t e0o n w a r do fa na g e n tw h os t a r t sw i t h
m money holding in period 0 at the beginning of the centralized market is
W(m,0,0,0) = −h(0) + V (m+1,b 2)
In a steady state equilibrium the expected discounted payoﬀ of an agent at the
end of market 1 with money holding m is
V (m,b)=( 1− n)[u(q)+βW(m − pq +  ,b, ,0)] + n[−qs + βW(m + pqs − d,b,0,d)]
where
W(m − pq +  ,b, ,0) = −hb + V (m+1,b +1)
W(m + pqs − d,b,0,d)=−hs + V (m+1,b +1)
22Using the deﬁnitions for W(m − pq +  ,b, ,0) and W(m + pqs − d,b,0,d)] we get
(1 − β)V (m,b)=( 1 − n)[u(q) − hb] − n[qs + hs]
=( 1 − n)[u(q) − q]+( R − 1)b
Hence, using the fact that h(0) = b, the expected discounted payoﬀ of a represen-
tative agent with m money holding in period 0 at the beginning of the centralized
market is
W(m,0,0,0)(1 − β)=( 1− n)[u(q) − q]+( βR− 1)b
which is equal to equation (2).
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst prove the if part. Assume ﬁrst z  =0and




0(q) − 1]. (24)
and from (15) we have
1 − Rβ
Rβ
≥ (1 − n)[u
0(q)/∆ − 1]. (25)
Use (25) to replace u0(q) in (24) and rearrange to get ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆.
Assume now that z  > 0 and zm > 0.T h e nf r o m( 1 7 )z  > 0 implies that 1+id >γ .
U s e( 1 6 )t or e p l a c eγ and rearrange to get ∆ < ˜ ∆.N e x td i v i d e( 1 7 )b y1+id and







since 1+id >γ .H e n c ew eh a v e1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆ if z  > 0 and zm > 0.
Finally, assume that z  > 0 and zm =0 . Then, the previous equation immediately
implies that ∆ =1 .
23We now prove the only if part. From (16) and (17) we get
1 − nβ − β (1 − n)u











≥ β (1 − n)u
0(q) (27)
Assume ﬁrst that 1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆. Use (26) to rewrite (27) as follows











0 < ˜ ∆ − ∆ ≤





Hence, 1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆ implies
z 
zm > 0.
Assume next that ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆.T h e nf r o m( 2 6 )w eh a v e
1 − nβ − β (1 − n)u
0(q) ≥ (1 − n)
³




Then z  > 0 immediately implies that
0 > ˜ ∆ − ∆ ≥
(1 − n)
³






a contradiction. Hence ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆ implies z  =0 .
Existence and uniqueness when ˜ ∆ ≤ ∆: In this case z  = b =0and from
(17) γ =1+id. Then, from (16) and (17) we get (24). Since right-hand side of (24)
is strictly decreasing in q there exists a unique q that solves (24). Finally, from (18)
we have zm = q.
Existence and uniqueness when 1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆: The system of equations (15)-
(18) with z  = βRb/∆ can be reduced as follows. Equations (18) and z  = βRb/∆
24imply zm = q − βRb/∆. Then, multiply both sides of (17) by zm and replace zm to
get
(q − βRb/∆)[γ − (1 + id)] = −(1 − n)z (i − id)
Use (16) to eliminate γ as follows
(q − βRb/∆)(1+id)(1 −
γ
1+id
)=( 1− n)z (i − id)
(q − βRb/∆)(1+id){1 − (1 − n)β[u
0(q) − 1] − β} =( 1− n)z (i − id)
(q − βRb/∆){1 − (1 − n)β[u









(q − βRb/∆){1 − (1 − n)β[u








0(q)/∆ + n (28)
q = βRbF(∆) (29)




0 [βRbF(∆)]/∆ + n ≡ RHS (30)
The left-hand side of (30) is constant while the right-hand side is decreasing in b for
ag i v e n1 ≤ ∆ < ˜ ∆. Moreover, we have limb→0 RHS =+ ∞ and limb→∞RHS = n<
1
Rβ. Hence, for any policy ∆ with 1 ≤ ∆ < ˜ ∆ a unique b>0 exists. Then, from (22)
a unique value for q exists. Accordingly a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium
exist.
Finally, we have lim∆→˜ ∆ F(∆)=+ ∞ and so b → 0.
25Proof of Proposition 2. Substituting (23) into the objective function the problem
becomes
max







s.t. ˆ q ≥ q ≥ ˜ q
After rearranging the ﬁrst-order condition is
(1 − n)[u










= ˆ λ − ˜ λ
where ˆ λ is the multiplier of the ﬁrst inequality and ˜ λ the one of the second inequality.
Consider the ﬁrst-order condition17and note that
∆(q)=
Rβ (1 − n)u0 (q)
1 − nRβ
Suppose that the optimal q is such that ∆ =1 , i.e., q =ˆ q.I n t h i s c a s e˜ λ =0and










which is a contradiction. Thus, in any equilibrium q<ˆ q implying ∆ > 1.
Now suppose that the optimal q is such that ∆ = ˜ ∆, i.e., q =˜ q.I n t h i s c a s e
˜ λ>0 and ˆ λ =0implying that Θ(˜ q,R) < 0. One can show that lim∆→˜ ∆ F (∆)=∞,
lim∆→˜ ∆ F0 (∆)=∞, lim∆→˜ ∆
F0(∆)∆





Moreover, (1 − n)[u0(q) − 1] = 1/β − 1. Accordingly, we get





(R − 1)(1 − n)
u00 (˜ q)˜ q
u0 (˜ q)
17The following proofs omit many intermediate steps. A ﬁle containing the full proof is available
upon request.
26Consider ﬁrst R → 1.T h e nw eh a v elimR→1 Θ(˜ q,R)=−∞. Now consider R → 1/β.









=0 .T h u s i f
R<R, q =˜ q and if R>R, q solves Θ(q,R)=0 .
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